Freud's usage of memory specifically does not imply conscious access, simply a persistence of structural changes and byproducts of experience (otherwise repression etc would be pure rather than only partly nonsense)
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okay, so conditioning is a form of memory to Freud without any need for episodic or semantic recall. fair my answer to your blackout question is obviously correct in Freud, then, since your lack of episodic memory is irrelevant
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so I guess my response here is that Jaynes quasi-psychoanalytic definition of consciousness as "being a linguistic subject" seems to be the only definition that still feels like it fits the boundaries we've just established, but it's unfortunately banal
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Replying to @qorprate @chaosprime and
the irony here is that if consciousness is downstream of language then qualia (as commonly defined) is inherently inaccessible to consciousness
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it isn't, though, Jaynes isn't just banal he's wrong
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pls provide me a better definition of consciousness then so I can "update my priors"
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i mean, having a subjective point of view that's experiencing things is the best way i know to point at it if i'm tabooing "qualia"
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"subjective" -> Cartesian subject -> downstream of language, consciousness as media etc "experiencing things" ("experience" as transitive verb) -> experience implies thingness -> aforementioned epistemological problems with qualia ^ not a full counterargument, just thoughts
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Descartes was just being a nerd, subjectivity isn't downstream of language, lots of people have memories of preverbal experiences, i do if he weren't so big a nerd it'd be "i experience therefor i am" i mean experiencing things in the idiomatic sense not the one from that page
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id argue subjectivity requires more than just memory, it requires a notion of selfhood, a subject and the colloquial usage of experience seems like either attention-to-perception (implying pattern/thing recognition) or else narrative self-insertion which implies a subject
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i don't think it does, i think experience comes first and we learn actually much, much later to assign those experiences to a persona-identity-history those things may be implied by the usage, yeah, which is a reason why the usage is a halfassed tool to use to point to the thing
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experience as pure pattern recognition doesn't necessarily require a subject, it's sort of like the subject emerges slowly as a higher level pattern above the experienced patterns... but at what point does a baby become conscious?
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real damn early, i claim raw conscious experience is the ground from which all this pattern recognition (construction) and identity boundary formation emerges, the fancy architecture depends on it, it does not depend on the fancy architecture
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