Yet, Zcash also “rolled their own crypto”, a fact which was well-covered in DLT media. Oddly, this hasn’t raised any red flags or comprehensive investigations into Zcash’s own cryptography, or blog posts from DCI with statements such as, “Please don’t roll your own crypto”.
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Replying to @Caprediem7
Zcash crypto went through two years of peer review, including publications in several top-tier academic crypto/security conferences and outside audit by some of the top security evaluation firms. Also, Zcash didn’t design an existing primitive (hash function).
4 replies 2 retweets 36 likes -
Replying to @matthew_d_green
Tell me why
@Ethan_Heilman from DCI a "top-tier academic" doenst want to publish the " vulnerability" code and proof his statement?1 reply 1 retweet 16 likes -
Replying to @Caprediem7 @Ethan_Heilman
What is the implication of this? That Hellman made the vulnerability up? That would be a serious accusation. Except for the fact that the IOTA developers acknowledged that the vulnerability exists - and even went so far as to claim they made it on purpose.
1 reply 0 retweets 23 likes -
Replying to @matthew_d_green @Ethan_Heilman
A lot of people asked repeatedly from
@Ethan_Heilman to publish the code and prove his statement and he is refusing this! Than the feeling is very strong that he made this up and commited academic fraude.1 reply 1 retweet 24 likes -
To bad this easy thing cant be answered,
@matthew_d_green if ur a academic person you can ask for the code from your friends of DCI and show us the proof.@neha@Ethan_Heilman@tangleblog1 reply 1 retweet 16 likes -
Replying to @Caprediem7 @Ethan_Heilman and
He gave you forged signature bundles. That's proof enough. You really think it's going to be good for IOTA if he spends time cleaning up his code and releases it publicly for another burst of bad publicity for IOTA? If you really want that I can ask him.
6 replies 1 retweet 22 likes -
Replying to @matthew_d_green @Caprediem7 and
Matthew, you teach cryptography at Johns Hopkins. You know that there are formal definitions allowing to see if a cryptosystem is broken or not. I'll make appearance that I haven't seen your "That's proof enough". And I hope you understand what favor I have just done for you.
1 reply 4 retweets 58 likes -
Replying to @c___f___b @Caprediem7 and
Yes. In the case of hash functions the definition is "can you produce a collision". In the case of signatures it's "can you produce a forged signature bundle". That's literally the definition.
2 replies 0 retweets 28 likes -
Replying to @matthew_d_green @Caprediem7 and
I never thought I would have to teach a teacher of Cryptography but ok... Formal definition is this: "can you produce a forged signature bundle" WITH A NON-NEGLIGIBLE CHANCE. So, with that in mind: How a single case and absence of PoC code allowing to replicate that is a proof?
7 replies 12 retweets 137 likes
you mean cryptography is like science? who woulda thunk? 

$IOTA #StoreOfDramapic.twitter.com/IyKFy7TrqK
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