6. End-to-end encryption disrupts this CSAM scanning process, because, well, let’s be honest, these scanners are a mass surveillance system — one with a specific (well-meaning) intent — and end-to-end encryption is designed to *stop* mass surveillance.
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7. I am *deeply* skeptical of Barr’s motivation here. After several years of opposing encryption on very different grounds (criminals, terrorists) and asking for access only with a warrant, suddenly making a hard right turn and saying “think about the children” — feels cynical.
5 replies 23 proslijeđena tweeta 140 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
8. Technically, the request is also a radical new ask. Previously, law enforcement wanted “exceptional access” — meaning only occasionally would they need to decrypt things. But CSAM scanning can’t be “exceptional”. It has to scan every single image you send.
1 reply 12 proslijeđenih tweetova 76 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
9. All of this has just been a prelude to describing the new proposed legislation
@Riana_Crypto discusses. This legislation is being introduced by Senators Graham and Blumenthal, and it reads like a “backdoor” attempt to squash end-to-end encryption. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/01/earn-it-act-how-ban-end-end-encryption-without-actually-banning-it …12 proslijeđenih tweetova 55 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
10. The basic strategy of this law is to make providers (Apple, Facebook, Google etc.) criminally liable for CSAM, unless they comply with a set of “recommended best practices” for detecting the stuff. But who determines those practices, and is encryption one of them?pic.twitter.com/w47LGT2AAJ
7 proslijeđenih tweetova 57 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
11. In short, the bill establishes an unelected comission, which must consist of “4 law enforcement reps, 4 tech industry reps, 2 reps of child safety organizations, and 2 computer scientists/software engineering experts”. They’ll decide what the best practices are.
8 proslijeđenih tweetova 54 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
12. The commission has to consider privacy and security. But that consideration is all they’re required to do. And even if they do recommend encryption: the AG can just override whatever they decide. And those problems are the tip of the iceberg. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/01/earn-it-act-how-ban-end-end-encryption-without-actually-banning-it …
1 reply 9 proslijeđenih tweetova 59 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
13. This thread has been long and I want to end it on a different note. There are a number of thoughtful people, including notably
@alexstamos, who feel that tech providers need to work harder to find ways to square this circle: ie allow encryption and CSAM detection to co-exist.4 proslijeđena tweeta 45 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
14. It is really hard for me to look at this kind of legislation (and the underlying, constantly shifting law enforcement strategy) and say “yes, these people are working with good intent to solve a problem, let’s make things easier for them.”
1 reply 14 proslijeđenih tweetova 81 korisnik označava da mu se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
15. “Let’s build encryption systems that are somehow compatible with (currently well-intentioned) mass surveillance, and hand them over to politicians who have displayed no consistent principles in seeking this capability” does not feel like the winning move in this game. //END
9 replies 54 proslijeđena tweeta 156 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit
US: You can’t use Huawei technology for anything, the Chinese government may have a backdoor to access your encrypted data Also US: American tech companies, we need a backdoor in your product to access encrypted communications of your users
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