BGPmon.net

@bgpmon

Monitoring the Internet

We have eyes everywhere
Vrijeme pridruživanja: lipanj 2010.

Tweetovi

Blokirali ste korisnika/cu @bgpmon

Jeste li sigurni da želite vidjeti te tweetove? Time nećete deblokirati korisnika/cu @bgpmon

  1. 17. stu 2019.

    Major Internet outages in Iran continues today. This is an example of the BGP routes visible for the "Iran Cell Service and Communication Company (AS44244)" network. As well as observed network traffic from Iran Cell. Note the clear drop at ~ 15:00 UTC Nov 16 in both graphs.

    Poništi
  2. 1. srp 2019.

    Operating BGP: “It’s more like an 18th-century Royal Navy frigate. There’s a lot of running around and screaming and shouting and pulling on ropes to try to get things going in the right direction.”

    Poništi
  3. proslijedio/la je Tweet

    The deep-dive into how Verizon and a BGP Optimizer Knocked Large Parts of the Internet Offline Monday

    Poništi
  4. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    24. lip 2019.

    Quick write-up on today's widespread Internet outage: This appears to me as a multi-organisational catastrophic failure in both process and technologies.

    Poništi
  5. 24. lip 2019.

    Actually looks like the end time was 12:37 UTC

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  6. 24. lip 2019.

    Many of the prefixes we new more specifics, indicating this was likely a BGP optimizer leaking routes which were then leaked to and accepted by Verizon. This caused outages for many networks including Cloudflare and Facebook, Amazon, and many more

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  7. 24. lip 2019.

    we can confirm that earlier today there was a large BGP incident, causing 20k prefixes for 2400 network to be rerouted through AS396531 (a steel plant). and then on to its transit provider: Verizon (AS701) Start time: 10:34:21 (UTC) End time: 13:26:07 (UTC)

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  8. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    24. lip 2019.

    Here's what an example alert for looked like (using my personal bgpmon test account)

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  9. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    24. lip 2019.

    Quick dumps through the data, showing about 2400 ASns (networks) affected. Cloudflare being hit the hardest. Top 20 of affected ASns below

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  10. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    24. lip 2019.

    doing some more digging. For now looking at a debug bgpmon account i have with various popular prefixes. Seeing 'BGP MITM' / 'route leak' alerts for at least many cloudflare prefixes and by the looks of it Facebook as well. 2 examples below:

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  11. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    24. lip 2019.

    wow waking up to some BGP madness! Looks like many (all) of AS 13335 prefixes are being rerouted through AS396531 (Allegheny Technologies) and Verizon AS701 is providing that transit via that path! Ugh not good! will dig more ...

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  12. 10. ožu 2019.

    Major dip in traffic from Venezuela over the last few days. Big dip started at March 7, 20:55 UTC. Still ongoing.

    Poništi
  13. 16. velj 2019.

    We are now using as our ROA validator. Thanks for the new CSV export feature and team!

    Poništi
  14. 15. sij 2019.
    Poništi
  15. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    28. pro 2018.

    BGP,HJ,hijacked prefix AS32982 192.208.19.0/24, U.S. Department of Energy,-,By AS4812 China Telecom (Group),

    Poništi
  16. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    28. pro 2018.

    Looks like North Korea dropped from the Internet today for a while

    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  17. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    28. pro 2018.
    Prikaži ovu nit
    Poništi
  18. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    26. stu 2018.

    China Telecom statement regarding the Google route leak (alleged BGP hijack) that happened two weeks ago: "The content of these reports was lack of factual evidence. The conclusion was ungrounded."

    Poništi
  19. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    19. stu 2018.

    BGP,HJ,hijacked prefix AS13335 104.18.54.0/24, Cloudflare Inc,-,By AS263903 INFORBARRA TELECOM,

    Poništi
  20. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    13. stu 2018.
    Odgovor korisnicima

    We have investigated the advertisement of prefixes through one of our upstream partners. This was an error during a planned network upgrade due to a misconfiguration on our BGP filters. The error was corrected within 74mins & processes put in place to avoid reoccurrence

    Poništi

Čini se da učitavanje traje već neko vrijeme.

Twitter je možda preopterećen ili ima kratkotrajnih poteškoća u radu. Pokušajte ponovno ili potražite dodatne informacije u odjeljku Status Twittera.

    Možda bi vam se svidjelo i ovo:

    ·