An imp. piece of information hygiene many seem to not know: if you ever send a previously-encrypted text in cleartext, you leak the keys.
@ianbfarquhar @Falkvinge if KPAs were a problem in practice with modern ciphers, full disk encryption wouldn't work
-
-
@bascule@Falkvinge You keep taking in absolutes. Crypto design is rarely absolute: it's a risk management exercise. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge if KPAs were a problem in practice, most of the things we use encryption for today simply wouldn't work -
@bascule@Falkvinge Go read the tweet history. I maintain you minimize it if you can as best practice. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge in most TLS use cases, 99.9% of the plaintext is known and we’re guarding things like session/CSRF tokens -
@bascule So let me restate my position, where the key has long term value & encrypts other data, best practice is to minimize KP access. -
@ianbfarquhar and let me restate my position: encrypting known plaintext with modern ciphers is commonplace and there are no known attacks -
@bascule I concur. But I focus on the "known". Unless there is formal proof that no KP attacks will ever be found... (More) -
@ianbfarquhar you should probably be more worried about related key attacks on AES and the AES key schedule in general - 1 more reply
New conversation -
-
-
@bascule@Falkvinge You avoid KP where possible. Disk encryption is a case where that is potentially difficult. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge or... encrypting any webpage that's visible by the public?
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.