An imp. piece of information hygiene many seem to not know: if you ever send a previously-encrypted text in cleartext, you leak the keys.
@ianbfarquhar @Falkvinge that’s called an OPSEC failure. It won’t help in pure cryptanalysis of e.g AES, Salsa, Chacha
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@bascule@Falkvinge Protocol design failure too. No KNOWN attacks. Focus on the "known". If attacks appear, bet they'll start as CP. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge it would be an indication that the cipher fails to provide what Claude Shannon calls “confusion” -
@bascule@Falkvinge Differential cryptanalysis (NSA term "directional derivative" according to Whit), or any statistical attack, is. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge if KPAs were a problem in practice with modern ciphers, full disk encryption wouldn't work -
@bascule@Falkvinge You keep taking in absolutes. Crypto design is rarely absolute: it's a risk management exercise. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge if KPAs were a problem in practice, most of the things we use encryption for today simply wouldn't work -
@bascule@Falkvinge Go read the tweet history. I maintain you minimize it if you can as best practice. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge in most TLS use cases, 99.9% of the plaintext is known and we’re guarding things like session/CSRF tokens - 5 more replies
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