An imp. piece of information hygiene many seem to not know: if you ever send a previously-encrypted text in cleartext, you leak the keys.
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@bascule@Falkvinge It still can assist, and on that basis, should be avoided. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge that’s called an OPSEC failure. It won’t help in pure cryptanalysis of e.g AES, Salsa, Chacha -
@bascule@Falkvinge Protocol design failure too. No KNOWN attacks. Focus on the "known". If attacks appear, bet they'll start as CP. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge it would be an indication that the cipher fails to provide what Claude Shannon calls “confusion” -
@bascule@Falkvinge Differential cryptanalysis (NSA term "directional derivative" according to Whit), or any statistical attack, is. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge if KPAs were a problem in practice with modern ciphers, full disk encryption wouldn't work -
@bascule@Falkvinge You keep taking in absolutes. Crypto design is rarely absolute: it's a risk management exercise. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge if KPAs were a problem in practice, most of the things we use encryption for today simply wouldn't work - 7 more replies
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@bascule@Falkvinge The worst mistake is to allow an attacker to be able to inject plaintext, facilitating chosen plaintext attacks. -
@ianbfarquhar@Falkvinge CPA != KPA
End of conversation
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