the only reason anybody becomes an error theorist is because they have skeletons in their closet 
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that's a rly good point, and imo perhaps lays the groundwork of a cognitivist emotivism?
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i'm just saying, if emotional statements have truth-value, that would point towards cognitivism but it doesn't in any way dispel the concept of moral statements being emotional statements. i certainly don't think "right" and "wrong" are qualities of platonic moral objects
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Moral statements might have emotional content, but I don't think that qualifies them as being emotional statements in and of themselves.
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They express something more than merely how one feels, but how one objectively ought to feel/act/be, and exist in relation to and as justification for a moral order aka hierarchy, which necessitates submission as morality.
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that sounds more like universal command theory than the view that morals are factually right or wrong. "murder is wrong", for instance, should be looked at as a metaphor - it is not factually incorrect to murder, what is actually being communicated is "you shouldn't murder"
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To say murder is wrong is the same as saying murder is evil or murder is immoral. The "wrongness" is in the moral sense. The implication is always that one ought be moral and ought not to be immoral. This is not to be an equivocation between facts and morality.
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The objectivity is implied in the imperative. If morality does not posit objective value, then what good reason is there to be moral over simply following out ones own whims? Without the idea of objective value, morality end up as an empty construct.
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