the only reason anybody becomes an error theorist is because they have skeletons in their closet 
Non-cognitivism makes more sense? Because when people are making moral statements they're basically just barking into the void? Moral statements are just mere babbles and are not truth apt whatsoever?
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statements of emotion/desire/command are only "mere babbles" and "barking into the void" if you only value logic and objectivity. in any case, i lean more towards meta-ethical prescriptivism, tho i can sympathize with emotivism as well
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Ummm... Okay then...
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basically, my point is that a moral statement being an emotional statement doesn't make it less meaningful. "i love you" is an emotional statement; so is "i'm afraid" or "he's jealous of me", and those statements are all clearly meaningful
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My problem with this is that I consider emotional statements to have truth-aptness. Why? Otherwise how could anyone lie about how they feel? It is my understanding that principly questions and commands fail to be truth-apt, whereas statements are propositions and are truth-apt.
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that's a rly good point, and imo perhaps lays the groundwork of a cognitivist emotivism?
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i'm just saying, if emotional statements have truth-value, that would point towards cognitivism but it doesn't in any way dispel the concept of moral statements being emotional statements. i certainly don't think "right" and "wrong" are qualities of platonic moral objects
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Moral statements might have emotional content, but I don't think that qualifies them as being emotional statements in and of themselves.
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