They do if they are going to be imposed on experimentalists. Alternatively just each to their own. But their needs to be compromise for collaborations to progress. Definitions need to be useful.
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W odpowiedzi do to @behrenstimb@PsychScientists i jeszcze
But hold on, who said experimentalists have to establish representation? I am perfectly happy with neural correlates. Find them very interesting, too.
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W odpowiedzi do to @KordingLab@PsychScientists i jeszcze
Wtf - why do you care what word I use if I am speaking in natural English? Are you just trying to make up for the fact that philosophers are using the wrong words again?
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W odpowiedzi do to @behrenstimb @KordingLab i jeszcze
Now Tim, philosophers are literally paid to make problems out of non-problems by engaging in confusing language games... they're only doing their jobs, be nice.
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W odpowiedzi do to @tyrell_turing @behrenstimb i jeszcze
There's a lot of subtle and useful philosophical work on representation that is worth a look.
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W odpowiedzi do to @attninaction @tyrell_turing i jeszcze
A problem is construing this as a debate about "usage". It's not in the 1st instance. Was Shannon legislating usage when he defined "information"? He did serious formal work to tell us what information is. Once we accepted that, yes, usage is fixed, becomes technically useful.
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W odpowiedzi do to @attninaction @tyrell_turing i jeszcze
Totally cool with formalising the word. Just don’t change it into something else (like causality), and don’t make definitions that make our lives harder (because they can’t be tested).
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W odpowiedzi do to @behrenstimb @attninaction i jeszcze
God, here I go violating my non-participation, but: Don't you think, Tim, that we assume causality, even if we can't demonstrate it? Don't we care about the activity patterns we observe because we assume the information they carry is being used downstream to guide behaviour?
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W odpowiedzi do to @tyrell_turing @attninaction i jeszcze
I'll just go back to my old example. Place cells exist in loads of behaviours where they are provably not causal (you can remove the hippocampus and behaviour is left in tact). I still think they have a representation. They are likely causally important for *something*
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W odpowiedzi do to @behrenstimb @tyrell_turing i jeszcze
I do not think it is about causal for *a given chosen task* but about potentially causal for *the set of all possible tasks*. And we know that hippocampus matters for certain tasks.
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Is it possible to use the twitter API to create a spider-diagram of these multiple threads so we can clearly see what the major arguments are and thus come to a consensus about the semantics of representation?
Wydaje się, że ładowanie zajmuje dużo czasu.
Twitter jest przeciążony lub wystąpił chwilowy problem. Spróbuj ponownie lub sprawdź status Twittera, aby uzyskać więcej informacji.
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