After an outcry against tying a focused anti-XSS syntax to the existing `X-XSS-Protection`, we're back to `ARTUR`: https://mikewest.github.io/artur-yes/
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Replying to @mikewest
Having an "unsafe" default seems to defeat the purpose of the naming convention.
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80% of apps use CSP with 'unsafe-eval' and injections into eval() are more rare than other XSS. It's a convenience thing.
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Replying to @arturjanc @mikewest
I get the convenience, but unsafe-by-default is how we got into this mess to begin with. :)
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CSP was safe by default but required arcane spells ('unsafe-eval') to make things work. So few people understood it.
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Replying to @arturjanc
: I’m pretty sure you told me two weeks ago that the syntactic warts weren’t the problem.
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I thought you convinced me that they are a problem for folks outside of major companies, so we need something simple :-)
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Replying to @arturjanc
: Yup. And I agree with me! But I think adding ‘eval:true’ or something isn’t a big step, seems like a reasonable burden.
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It's boilerplate that everyone will have to include, with negligible security value. But not the end of the world.
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A new simple thing to avoid the mistakes of CSP would be more powerful if it focused on the things we know are important.
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Which in this case are nonces/hashes for blessing scripts and not getting developers to hunt down eval().
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