Conversation

1/ Heroku was a hot company in 2010. But we had yet to deliver out our full product vision: the platform was Ruby-only, lacked background processes and a bunch of other capabilities needed for more substantial apps.

2/ The decision to accept the acquisition was made by me, the two other founders, and the CEO. (With input from our investors, of course.) We saw it as a big funding round: never need to raise money again, and in the meantime get legitimacy for enterprise sales.

3/ But let's be honest: the money mattered. Getting a good outcome for investors, for early employees, and yes for ourselves.

3a/ (I put a bunch of the proceeds from this into the 2014 Colorado campaign to legalize recreational marijuana. So I guess you can partially thank Salesforce for that legal weed you've been enjoying during lockdown)

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4/ Also—and this might seem hard to remember looking back—Y Combinator was financially unproven. They had built a huge about of prestige the the Valley, but IIRC at the time they were still in the red. (

@paulg

correct me if I have that wrong)

5/ I figured Heroku's return for YC would help prove their model. That mattered to us, given that going through the YC program had been a life-changing experience.

6/ After the acquisition, the Salesforce folks I worked with were great. They generally wanted whatever was best for Heroku's team and customers. I learned a lot from time spent with

, and others.

7/ On the downside, there were many ways SFDC values didn't overlap with Heroku values. One prominent example is Heroku's team valuing sleek and minimalist design.