Here's the thing. It's *locally* rational to pay protection money to a thug who might protect you from other thugs. (Which is more or less what sexual attraction to powerful-but-amoral men is.) It's not rational if a large enough group can commit to not doing it.
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Odgovor korisnicima @s_r_constantin @RokoMijicUK
This is basically the same thing as "infantry can beat cavalry if they stay in formation but not if anybody turns and flees." Yes, it's a coordination problem! That's the whole point I'm trying to make!
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Odgovor korisnicima @s_r_constantin @RokoMijicUK
Recognizing that collectively you have more power than your enemies, and sticking to your positions even if it's scary, is an actual thing that can ever work, and history is full of examples.
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Odgovor korisniku/ci @s_r_constantin
yeah but you need a coordination mechanism. Otherwise game-theoretically it's the free rider problem i.e. many person prisoner's dilemma and the Nash Equilibrium is everyone defects. Militaries need discipline and in historical battles most casualties were after one side broke.
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Odgovor korisnicima @RokoMijicUK @s_r_constantin
so what you're asking for is for people to all coordinate to solve a collective action problem without any coordination mechanism and no that doesn't work
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Odgovor korisniku/ci @RokoMijicUK
No, I'm not saying that exactly. Moral exhortation *is* a kind of coordination mechanism. (i.e. having the concept of "courage" is a pretty key element in getting soldiers not to flee!) I think things are bad enough that exhortation to trust your own judgment is necessary.
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Odgovor korisnicima @s_r_constantin @RokoMijicUK
Not sufficient of course.
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Odgovor korisniku/ci @s_r_constantin
& you can test this with game theory experiments: get 100 anonymous strangers and make them play a many-person prisoner's dilemma. They will get the Nash equilibrium.
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Odgovor korisnicima @RokoMijicUK @s_r_constantin
Most empirical work shows evolutionary sensitivity to: the value of cooperation, signal/noise ratios, the cost & griefing ratio of punishment, retaliatory abilities, the ability to watch others, metanorms (related to punishing non-punishers and rewarding cops), etc, etc...
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Odgovor korisnicima @almostlikethat @RokoMijicUK
"evolutionary sensitivity" means what here?
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You can simulate it and "(simulated) nature finds a way". I think that normal humans are pretty good at intuitively navigating a lot of these issues (because "social mammal") but bad at articulating descriptively and strategically correct theories (because science is hard).
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Odgovor korisnicima @almostlikethat @s_r_constantin
we're good at navigating them at scale ~= Dunbar number and under a "fixed pie" assumption where there's no economic growth, because that's a good approximation of most of our evolutionary history.
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IMO this mismatch between our game-theory instincts and the actual world we live in is the cause of many of our problems.
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