A theory of aesthetics should explain why I like the things I like, but cannot claim that I *should* like something, as this is arbitrary.
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Replying to @CurlOfGradient
If a theory claims I should like something that I don't in fact like, or vice versa, then the theory fails to correspond to reality.
1 reply 1 retweet 2 likes -
Replying to @CurlOfGradient
Aesthetics is, and can only be, a post facto explanation of preferences which already exist.
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Replying to @CurlOfGradient
@CurlOfGradient what if I have preferences about my preferences, i.e. I want to like something because it makes the self more elegant?1 reply 0 retweets 3 likes -
Replying to @allgebrah
@allgebrah That's a good question, are meta-preferences just preferences?3 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @CurlOfGradient
@allgebrah What if one believes they should like X, but can not actually enjoy X no matter how hard they try?3 replies 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @CurlOfGradient
@CurlOfGradient some are irreconcilable without meta: let's say I love the taste of meat but am ethically absolutely opposed to eating it1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @allgebrah
@allgebrah I'd say that you still love the taste of meat aesthetically, and your ethical stance against it doesn't change that2 replies 1 retweet 2 likes
@CurlOfGradient the distinction between having a preference and acting on it
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