4. Since demanding backdoors has gone nowhere, US AG William Barr and others recently switched strategies. In an open letter, they demanded that Facebook delay encryption plans because it would hinder filtering of “child sexual abuse material” (CSAM).https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-barr-signs-letter-facebook-us-uk-and-australian-leaders-regarding-use-end …
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5. This filtering already happens in some networks, like Facebook. It involves scanning every (unencrypted) picture and video you send *in real time* to see if it contains child pornography. Any hits are reported to an agency called NCMEC.
1 reply 10 proslijeđenih tweetova 52 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
6. End-to-end encryption disrupts this CSAM scanning process, because, well, let’s be honest, these scanners are a mass surveillance system — one with a specific (well-meaning) intent — and end-to-end encryption is designed to *stop* mass surveillance.
1 reply 14 proslijeđenih tweetova 74 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
7. I am *deeply* skeptical of Barr’s motivation here. After several years of opposing encryption on very different grounds (criminals, terrorists) and asking for access only with a warrant, suddenly making a hard right turn and saying “think about the children” — feels cynical.
5 replies 23 proslijeđena tweeta 140 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
8. Technically, the request is also a radical new ask. Previously, law enforcement wanted “exceptional access” — meaning only occasionally would they need to decrypt things. But CSAM scanning can’t be “exceptional”. It has to scan every single image you send.
1 reply 12 proslijeđenih tweetova 76 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
9. All of this has just been a prelude to describing the new proposed legislation
@Riana_Crypto discusses. This legislation is being introduced by Senators Graham and Blumenthal, and it reads like a “backdoor” attempt to squash end-to-end encryption. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/01/earn-it-act-how-ban-end-end-encryption-without-actually-banning-it …12 proslijeđenih tweetova 55 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
10. The basic strategy of this law is to make providers (Apple, Facebook, Google etc.) criminally liable for CSAM, unless they comply with a set of “recommended best practices” for detecting the stuff. But who determines those practices, and is encryption one of them?pic.twitter.com/w47LGT2AAJ
7 proslijeđenih tweetova 57 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
11. In short, the bill establishes an unelected comission, which must consist of “4 law enforcement reps, 4 tech industry reps, 2 reps of child safety organizations, and 2 computer scientists/software engineering experts”. They’ll decide what the best practices are.
8 proslijeđenih tweetova 54 korisnika označavaju da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
12. The commission has to consider privacy and security. But that consideration is all they’re required to do. And even if they do recommend encryption: the AG can just override whatever they decide. And those problems are the tip of the iceberg. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/01/earn-it-act-how-ban-end-end-encryption-without-actually-banning-it …
1 reply 9 proslijeđenih tweetova 59 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit -
13. This thread has been long and I want to end it on a different note. There are a number of thoughtful people, including notably
@alexstamos, who feel that tech providers need to work harder to find ways to square this circle: ie allow encryption and CSAM detection to co-exist.4 proslijeđena tweeta 45 korisnika označava da im se sviđaPrikaži ovu nit
As we are laying out in a paper I’ve been tinkering with for months, I think detection of known CSAM on E2EE will not have as positive a ratio of impact to privacy risk as other mitigations aimed at abuses where the victim is part of the conversation.
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Odgovor korisnicima @alexstamos @matthew_d_green
When you look at the real risks of Facebook going to E2EE everywhere, other abuse types are much more likely. Non-encrypted file sharing services are already the largest conduits for CSAM and I think that will continue no matter what happens to Messenger.
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Odgovor korisnicima @alexstamos @matthew_d_green
Looking forward to reading the paper, Alex.
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