Let's game this out (thread): The Risch-Menendez bill will soon become law, but implementation, as with CAATSA, may be slowed by a reluctant POTUS, committed to Patriot talks with RTE. Still, even in the absence of implementation, things between US-TR will be impacted.
Conversation
The issue is the provision for the embargo of arms that could be used for offensive operations in Syria. How will this be defined? As I see it, that’s basically everything outside the Navy (no ocean). Will also designate Turkish officials, perhaps including Akar again
1
2
The virtual arms embargo — in combo with CAATSA — means no congressional sign off on weapons exports to Turkey. So it is, de facto, an embargo. Now, the NDAA also dropped this week and, unsurprisingly, there is consensus language blocking F35 transfer and funds to store TURAF F35
1
1
Meanwhile, Ankara has signaled it could retaliate and complicate US activities at Incirlik and Kurecik. This is, quite honestly, not as big a deal as it will be made out to be. Incirlik has a lot of political significance but, operationally, it’s not much.
1
1
4
It’s core function, of course, is for Turkish defense in a NATO contingency — which is separate from US-TR bilateral agreements. Kurecik is US operated but in service of a NATO missile defense mission. So TR would have to be willing to mess with NATO on that one.
1
1
2
But, sure, there are things Ankara can do but it would be more political than functional and, of siloed, not negatively undermine NATO operational planning. EXCEPT, of course, that Ankara remains defiant on the Graduate Response Plan for the southern flank b/c of the YPG issue
1
1
Amidst this discord, Ankara will have a choice to make. With S-400 becoming operational in April 2020, as TR has made clear, and discussions ongoing for Su35 and more S400, the writing is on the wall for more TR-RU cooperation. It may also become a necessity. Why? ITAR
1
3
For those following the ATAK helo export talks with Pakistan, the tangent is useful. TR needs US licenses to export domestic kit that include US components. Hence, helo exports have been held up. A sanctioned SSB, of course, could have trouble with traditional defense partners
2
1
3
Making cooperation Europe difficult. Faced with these factors, cooperation with Russia on Su-35 makes some sense. Why? It’s an interim solution to the Gen 4 fighter crunch Ankara will face w/out a congressionally signed off on F16 life extension program
1
3
And with TR’s emphasis on local production, a non-US derived engine for, say, TFX makes sense. It also escapes ITAR and is relatively immune from sanctions on, potentially, SSB. Further, as was revealed at the NATO summit, there is little EU support for TR on S400 or Russia
1
1
So, as we look back, it is so clear that, first, delaying CAATSA was a mistake. It’s less harsh and, if done smartly, could have been paired with US offers on, say, the Gen 4 gap to at least make Ankara squirm about Su-35. But .. let’s fast forward to April
1
1
When Ankara invites A Haber to the S400 deployment ceremony, the same senators will agitate, again, for CAATSA. Trump’s “offer” of a freed trade deal and Patriot will have expired, leaving him to face pressure to do something. If he moves, CAATSA still imposed
1
5
Which results in arms embargo and CAATSA. Reminder: Much of Europe imposed the same embargo over Peace Spring. Without realizing it, it’s very very easy to see into May 2020. It’s bad. We’re staring down a TURAF that has 4 squadrons of Su-35, a TSK with S400, sanctions, EU anger
1
1
6
Which takes me back to the NDAA. Why is there so little money appropriated for other alternatives inside Europe. It’s time to get serious here. Prudence dictates thinking about where this is going.
2
6