Ashley Jackson

For those critical of the Afghanistan withdrawal deal with the Taliban, remember that diplomacy is the art of the possible not the science of the ideal. And what is possible is connected to what your adversary knows to be your interests (and their rank-ordering and intensity).

It also is connected to the perceived local balance of power (and its expected trajectory, sui generis and what is most likely to change).

And so for those who think that we should have negotiated a better deal (beyond on the margins changes) and who were/are advocates of Obama's pivot to Asia or the GPC concept in the NSS, recall the message you sent with the latter and how it impacted the former.

When you have a weak hand (low intensity of interests in the expanded war aims, local balance of power, TB momentum, ineffective and corrupt governance, weak partner commitment, etc), you get a deal that you can that saves some face and gets something you need that you think....

...also dovetails with interests of adversary given the credible threats you can make (TB commitments vis-a-vis terrorists in face of American threat to return again in force).

A heavy "conditions-based" deal was never in the cards. TB would never accept it & dubious it could be achieved even with much greater commitment of forces and other resources. Trying to make such a deal would look very obviously like ultimatum made by Austria to Serbia in 1914.