Ashley Jackson

Right...but unilaterally announcing that you're going to give your adversary 50% of what they want for free, as Trump did in Dec 2018 when he stated half U.S. forces would be out by spring, is an objectively terrible way to negotiate. All downhill from there.

I'm old enough to remember tweeting this...5 days ago. Now, the president has given #Taliban the other half of what they want, once again for price of...nothing. We can argue the merits all day, but it's time to reduce expectations (even further) for current #Doha negotiations.

To be clear, I should have stated "most of the other half" since roughly 2,500 U.S. forces would remain. The point is that it is now clear to #Taliban that U.S. presence is REALLY no longer tied to progress on peace negotiations. Likely doesn't bode well for current #Doha talks

Now I’m agreeing with you. Before, I was pretty sure the folks @USFOR_A were well read-in on the drawdown to 4500, had planned for it, approved of it, etc. Not at all convinced that’s the case for this drawdown to 2500 (FWIW, I don’t think it’ll be zero by Christmas)

I'm curious what people like you guys, far better versed in the military mechanics make of the 2500 figure. What does that even do? Protect embassies in Kabul? Bagram and RS HQ remain...but how much weight does that have? I mean, it is still a deterrent(?) and deeply symbolic...

But what actually can they do? (versus what they could do at 4500) Instinctually, 2500 feels much more...tokenistic. But I have no idea what the tactical implications really are.

What I've been told is that counterterrorism capabilities remain fully functional, anywhere in the country, at 4500ish. Not sure if that remains true when cut in half. BUt I'm sure Jon and Jason have an even better idea of what this means.

Beyond CT capabilities, I'd also be curious how/if this further reduction will impact security and (already severely limited) movement for diplomats.