Ashley Jackson

7th Q is for @a_a_jackson: When the #ANDSF are successful in recapturing areas from the #Taliban, what kind of reception is the govt of #Afghanistan getting in those areas? #AFGPanel 25/n

8th Q is for @JarrettBlanc: What is the best possible deal that can be reached between @ashrafghani & @DrabdullahCE? And in the USG’s view, what does a good deal between them look like? #AFGPanel 26/n

9th Q is for @a_a_jackson: What methods would you consider to be most successful in countering corruption at district/local levels in #Afghanistan? What accountability avenues exist in regards to reporting local government abuse/corruption? #AFGPanel 27/n

10th Q is for @Afghan_Policy: IRT identity consciousness among the Afghan #Taliban on the basis of Kandahari and non-Kandahari: Do you think this can damage cohesion of the TB after they get representation in the future government of #Afghanistan? #AFGPanel 28/n

#AFGPanel I believe that is a very difficult Q to answer, but I will try my best. The fact that the TB started as a local uprising the Kandahar naturally caused a disproportionate representation of Kandaharis during the Taliban reign. Not only in power positions but rank & file

#AFGPanel However, after the US's involvement, the TB began a concerted effort to transform into a all Pashtun movement. They rallied Pashtuns under various purported grievances. Interesting to note, even today, a large no of their support stems from Pashtun nationalists.

#AFGPanel However, during the US surge, we noticed another transformation, with the Taliban buying in non-Pashtun groups. This culminated in recent years with several new additions to the TB's Central Shura, with newcomers hailing from non-Pashtun groups.

For example, members of non-Pashtuns now include a Sunni Hazara, a Turkmen, and several Tajiks and Uzbeks. Currently I think, Kandahari Pashtuns, barely make up 50% of the total Central Shura personnel.