2/9 There are good lessons from 2014 about what analysis was useful, and still is, during wildly uncertain periods. Heartbreaking to read what might've been, but there are still hints about what could lie ahead. So here’s a tweet chain trip down memory lane.
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3/9 Thinking 5-10 years ahead, using solid data to do it, is useful Specifically this. Thanks Richard Hogg et al at
@WorldBank! Could you do an update? Cold hard scenario planning would help right now, because no one has any idea where this is gonna go http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Images/305983-1334954629964/AFTransition2014Vol2.pdf …Näytä tämä ketju -
4/9 Did I mention solid data? A lot of the theorizing about philosophizing/political about Kabul-centric dynamics proved incorrect or besides the pt. Doesn’t seem like it would’ve very been helpful at the time. Opinions on this are like (a certain body part): everyone has one
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5/9 Plus Afg politicos are savvy, often 10 steps ahead of any policy wonk. Prospects for outsider influence here are pretty slim. Focusing on what the int com CAN influence over the long term is a better bet (*cough* power analysis, that looks beyond the Kabul elite, would help)
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6/9 Curiously few people were looking at the Taliban’s plan for transition. Might've helped. Not stuff done on a handful of intrvws, but rigorous study of past strategies/adaptations? They're so unpredictable I cringe every time I offer TB analysis. But you gotta start somewhere
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