Nima ShiraziVerified account

The false narrative that Iran had a "robust," "clandestine" & "active" nuclear weapons program prior to 2003 relies on the assumption that Iranian black market purchases of dual-use nuclear equipment (all nuclear tech is dual-use, folks) reveals a "secret" program to build bombs.

This willfully omits the fact that, since the early 1980s, the Iranian government sought international partnership and trade for its nascent nuclear energy program, only to be deliberately denied access to nuclear tech by the US (a violation itself of the NPT).

In 1982, Iranian state media reported that, following the "discovery of uranium resources," "Iran was taking concrete measures for importing nuclear technology, while at the same time utilizing Iranian expertise in the field.

In 1983, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization invited the IAEA to visit its nuclear sites in Esfahan and Tehran and requested assistance from the IAEA in resuming its research in domestic uranium enrichment and possibly setting up a pilot enrichment plant.

As soon as the U.S. government got wind of such potential cooperation, it "directly intervened," demanding the IAEA cease all assistance to Iran. "We stopped that in its tracks," said a former U.S. official years later.

Following American obstruction, "the IAEA dropped plans to help Iran on fuel production and uranium conversion." Nevertheless, Iran pushed forward with its research, and in 1985 discovered even more uranium deposits near Yazd. This was no secret: the BBC even reported on it.

By the early 1990s, the IAEA was appraised of Iran's progress, had visited Iran's uranium mines, finding - according to official IAEA statements - "no cause for concern."

In 2000, Iran declared to the IAEA that it was constructing a Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) near Esfahan, an industrial scale plant for converting yellowcake into UF6 feedstock, nuclear material to be fed into centrifuges for further enrichment.

The size of the facility, its open declaration to the IAEA and subsequent safeguards and inspections, dispelled all possibility of use in a clandestine weapons program. Furthermore, that Iran would also build an enrichment plant of similar scale is obvious. Why else have an UCF?

While much is often made of the 2002 revelation of Iran's supposedly clandestine enrichment plant at Natanz, rarely do we hear that the pilot facility was still under construction when it was declared by Iran to the IAEA.

Per Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA at the time, Iran was under no obligation to declare it was building a pilot plant until 180 days before it expected to introduce nuclear material into the plant.

Following an official declaration of the Natanz plant to the IAEA, Iran also publicly announced in February 2003 that it would begin domestically mining uranium at Saghand for an indigenous enrichment program.

In response, here's what IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming told the press: "This comes as no surprise to us, as we have been aware of this uranium exploration project for several years now. In fact, a senior IAEA official visited this mine in 1992."

Natanz was not operational until June 2006, at which point it had already been under IAEA safeguards for over three years. Hardly the lynchpin of a clandestine weapons program.

Beyond all this, the media never - EVER - mentions the 2007 Work Plan, established between Iran & the IAEA, which defined the way to "clarify the outstanding issues" in relation to Iran's nuclear program. (That means the accusations made by the US & Israel.)

With regard to plan, then IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei pointed out that although "these outstanding issues are the ones that have led to the lack of confidence, the crisis... We have not come to see any undeclared activities or weaponization of their programme."

This conclusion was reached after two years of Iran's voluntary implementation of the IAEA's Additional Protocol, including a complete suspension of its enrichment program, which allowed intrusive and unfettered access to Iranian facilities for its inspectors.

Despite the constant allegations of nuclear weapons work, the IAEA confirmed that "there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities... were related to a nuclear weapons programme."

The Work Plan - which found in Iran's favor for each issue - was supposed to be the final nail in the coffin for allegations about secret weapons work. But the IAEA moved the goal posts.

Much of the supposed "evidence" of "alleged studies" into weapons (also known as "possible military dimensions" or PMD) is thought to have come from Israel itself - and has long been considered dubious by the IAEA itself.

Nevertheless, through it all, the IAEA has consistently affirmed that there exists "no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme."

Netanyahu's silliness is just the latest in a four-decade-long farce designed to punish and isolate Iran for daring to overthrow a US-backed dictator, deny it energy sustainability and economic security, and lay the groundwork for regime change.