Preference utilitarianism isn't like total or average utilitarianism. There can't be a "repugnant conclusion" unless people prefer it.
i don't have a hard criterion for what's selfish but i think "selfish want about population ethics" is weird
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Like, it's still invalid to apply the repugnant-conclusion argument to preference utilitarianism.
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"i selfishly want there to be happy people in a galaxy far away who will never causally affect me" seems wrong
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i.e. you can want that, but it's a want on the level of "i want preference utilitarianism"
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not a want of the kind that preference utilitarianism aggregates
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Selfish wants about population ethics are like "I want kids" or "I want there to be more people around here"
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(or the opposite of those things of course)
End of conversation
New conversation -
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