Preference utilitarianism isn't like total or average utilitarianism. There can't be a "repugnant conclusion" unless people prefer it.
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Right, I agree that's important. So it's what people selfishly want wrt population ethics.
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i think "selfish" means it's about things in your own life. wealth or success or love or whatever
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I'm not sure, but in that case there's still indirect preferences on population. And those would be it.
End of conversation
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CEV involves some sort of combining of all-things-considered preferences, but
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as i see it CEV isn't a moral theory and is distinct from preference utilitarianism, which is a moral theory
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also, i don't think it's the case that Model prefers repugnancy and others do not
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rather, everyone's repugnancy pref is conditional on some sort of uncertain outcome of how intuitions play out
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(i think Model is mostly objectively correct on how these intuitions play out, others mostly objectively wrong)
End of conversation
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