do the interests of a bilocating person count double? do the interests of two physically identical people at different locations count double? do the interests of two psychologically identical but physically distinct people count double?
i'm interested in the relative compressibility criterion - can you say more on it?
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Assume minds can be emulated. Copying a mind to create two instances clearly doesn't double the moral weight; otherwise deleting one of the copies would be murder, despite the person's situation being the same in all observables. [...]
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(Such would also imply emulation itself was serial murder as you moved from disk to memory, etc.) But two infants started from identical minds, and then raised separate lives, are intuitively double the weight; they've diverged sufficiently.
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