Hot take: many philosophical puzzles arise from a failure to distinguish objects from their isomorphism classes.https://twitter.com/GrumplessGrinch/status/936762314493108224 …
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Care to elaborate?
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I personally find the term "qualia" unhelpful because it gets bogged down in a lot of definitional difficulties (David Chalmers avoids the term for similar reasons), but I have no sympathy whatsoever for Dennett-style eliminativism
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In fact, I have my own hypothesis that people who find functionalism and/or eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness plausible are likely suffering from some form of aphantasia or are unable to conceptualize experiences as distinct from their objects
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I don't think we would find a debate useful on this matter.
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Also I'm getting blasted by a migraine. I'm with Dennett, although I think his argument can be simplified. Sensing a red object is a specific neurophysical event; relating that sense to the reference complex of memories of other red sensings is a different event.
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Because they occur at almost the same instant, we confuse them. But the reference complex of red memories is analogous to an equivalence class containing the specific sensation. But, as noted, I have a migraine and don't want to argue this.
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(All of which is to say that there's no such thing as 'qualia'; the discourse is hopelessly muddled and needs to start over. But that's true of most things.)
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I'm gonna go ahead and say that I could not possibly disagree with anything as strongly and vehemently as I disagree with you on this, and I cannot even fathom being able to come anywhere close to sincerely holding the view that you've given
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. Banned in Sweden. SubGenius, Zhuangist, white-hat troll. Defrocked mathematician. Brain problems.