Conversation

SBF
@SBF_FTX
Replying to
@SBF_FTX
15) A few weeks ago, FTX was handling ~$10b/day of volume and billions of transfers. But there was too much leverage--more than I realized. A run on the bank and market crash exhausted liquidity. So what can I try to do? Raise liquidity, make customers whole, and restart.
1,925
1,971
SBF
@SBF_FTX
16) Maybe I'll fail. Maybe I won't get anything more for customers than what's already there. I've certainly failed before. You all know that now, all too well. But all I can do is to try. I've failed enough for the month. And part of me thinks I might get somewhere.
4,420
2,823
SBF
@SBF_FTX
17) I know you've all seen this, but here's where things stand today, roughly speaking. [LOTS OF CAVEATS, ETC.] Liquid: -$8b Semi: +$5.5b Illiquid: +$3.5b And yeah, maybe that $9b illiquid M2M isn't worth $9b (+$1b net). OTOH--a month ago it was worth $18b; +$10b net. ---
2,155
1,852
SBF
@SBF_FTX
19) Once upon a time--a month ago--FTX was a valuable enterprise. FTX had ~$10-15b of daily volume, and roughly $1b of annual revenue. $40b of equity value. And we were held as paragons of running an effective company.
273
440
SBF
@SBF_FTX
20) I was on the cover of every magazine, and FTX was the darling of Silicon Valley. We got overconfident and careless.
376
556
SBF
@SBF_FTX
21) And problems were brewing. Larger than I realized. [AGAIN THESE NUMBERS ARE APPROXIMATE, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, ETC.] Leverage built up-- ~$5b of leverage, backed by ~$20b of assets which were.... Well, they had value. FTT had value, in EV! But they had risk.
264
392
SBF
@SBF_FTX
22) And that risk was correlated--with the other collateral, and with the platform. And then the crash came. In a few day period, there was a historic crash--over 50% in most correlated assets, with no bid side liquidity. And at the same time there was a run on the bank.
232
408
SBF
@SBF_FTX
23) Roughly 25% of customer assets were withdrawn each day--$4b. As it turned out, I was wrong: leverage wasn't ~$5b, it was ~$13b. $13b leverage, total run on the bank, total collapse in asset value, all at once. Which is why you don't want that leverage. ---
903
806
SBF
@SBF_FTX
Replying to
@SBF_FTX
26) Well, that gives some color, I guess. It sucks. I'm really sorry that things ended up as they did. And as I said--I'm going to do everything I can to make it more right.
89
188
SBF
@SBF_FTX
27) A few thoughts: a) It's *really* hard to be a regulator. They have an impossible job: to regulate entire industries that grow faster than their mandate allows them to. And so often they end up mostly unable to police as well as they ideally would.
65
178
SBF
@SBF_FTX
28) Even so, there are regulators who have deeply impressed me with their knowledge and thoughtfulness. The CFTC has; the SCB, and VARA, too. And others, scattered. But most are overwhelmed.
61
154
SBF
@SBF_FTX
29) Which means that interacting with regulatory structures can be really frustrating: a *huge* amount of work--much of it arbitrary--and relatively little customer protection. Fuck that. You all deserve frameworks that let regulators protect customers while allowing freedom.
86
176
SBF
@SBF_FTX
30) (Some of what I said was thoughtless or overly strong--I was venting and not intending that to be public. I guess at this point what I write leaks anyway.)
91
181
SBF
@SBF_FTX
31) And in the future, I'm going to care less about the dumb, contentless, "good actor" framework. What matters is what you do--is *actually* doing good or bad, not just *talking* about doing good or *using ESG language*.
330
352
SBF
@SBF_FTX
32) Anyway -- none of that matters now. What matters is doing the best I can. And doing everything I can for FTX's customers.
1,754
541
Show replies