I think you're just misinterpreting that post and drawing the wrong conclusions. It's about a hardware attack, and a general purpose computer running Linux is far more vulnerable to the same kind of attacks. It ignores the passphrase feature and is unnecessarily dishonest too.
I really like the @nitrokey - code has been audited by @cure53berlin so that is a huge plus in my book, and there's tons of eyes on the code as @linuxfoundation maintainers use them as well. Nothing against @Trezor - they are an incredible company and I use their devices for btc
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Entering a password on device (like you mention) is a big plus for Trezor though, as is their open CPU. (What smart card does nitrokey use?)
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I find the recovery model to be the biggest advantage of the approach based on deterministic wallet design. The hardware wallet generates a high entropy seed, displays it as a recovery phrase and you can write it down, store it and recover without exposing it to the computer.
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I'm talking about the differences in the approach though, not implementations, i.e. recovery / backups, passphrase entry and deniability along with whether keys / passphrases need to be exposed to a general purpose computer as part of that.
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Traditional security keys store keys and having those encrypted with a passphrase entry requires exposing the passphrase to the attached computer. Similarly, there isn't a great story when it comes to recovery / backups. I'm not knocking it as an implementation of that model.
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