The other big lesson here is that using a weak PIN to protect a strong key is difficult at best.
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Replying to @mattblaze
@mattblaze@stribika The safe design is using a HSM that destroys the weak-PIN-protected key after N fails, but has passphrase to restore it1 reply 2 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @RichFelker
@mattblaze@stribika Then attackers can't brute force the weak PIN, but asshole "friends" can't erase your device either.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
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Replying to @mattblaze
@mattblaze@stribika The only problem is that you have to remember a passphrase that you very-rarely use.2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @stribika
@stribika@mattblaze How do you implement a secure delay that can't be bypassed? Without early wipe, attacker has incentive to experiment.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes
Replying to @stribika
@stribika @mattblaze Yes, clock seems like an external input that could be forged.
12:48 PM - 17 Feb 2016
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