I think the difference is in controlling the brand and by doing so allowing the end-user to discern a visible difference. "This is real Chrome and when I'm in this, it's not cooperating with the boss spying." "This is the work browser that I have to use so that they see."
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Write me a program that can safely assert something when the Administrator is malicious, it can be as simple as you like. Make it show the result of X509_verify() or something in a message box.
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That's impossible. But what is possible is asserting "either someone committing a crime is in control of this machine, or any certificate it accepts is sufficiently legitimate that your non-backdoored phone/laptop would also accept it".
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Serious question, If I told you yesterday that today you would be arguing for DRM and that Administrators don't have the right to modify software on their own computers, would you have believed me?
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No, because that's not what I'm arguing here. I don't think DRM is necessary or good. I think TM&© are. I don't think you lack a right to modify sw on your own computer. I do think you lack a right to put modified sw in front of a user who's unaware it's modified.
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You're dropping the DRM argument, and now you're only arguing for the legal thing? To make sure we're on the same page, you believe that owning a computer does not give you the right to alter the software on it?
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I never made the DRM argument; that was someone else. I noted that having obfuscations in each new binary version to make it a pain to keep up with patching might raise the cost of MITM crapware, but didn't go so far as advocate it because my preferred approach is legal.
End of conversation
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