will you join me in my (probably feeble) attempt to talk the good peoples at Chrome out of removing Token Binding support? https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/OkdLUyYmY1E … it's not like the future of web security is at stake or anything... #PleaseKeepTokenBindingInChrome #TokenBinding
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Subdomain takeover is a real risk most developers and even many security reviewers aren't aware of, but if you are aware enough to try to mitigate you should properly scope cookies...
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Sharing credentials is a 101-level fail...
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So subdomain takeover looks like the big one, and whether the tradeoffs of token binding are worth it seems to depend on how hard it is to fix poorly scoped cookies.
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there are, of course, all kinds of protections available to prevent cookie theft. Token binding is unique in that it can prevent use after theft rather than trying to stop the theft itself. Both have value. Defence in depth etc. Token Binding also ...
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... can apply to things like OAuth and SSO tokens, which don't necessarily have the same characteristics as cookies. The browser case is maybe less compelling b/c of other cookie protections. But it's still useful IMHO. And, for better or worse, ...
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adoption and deployment at large likely hinges on the browser supporting it
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But you dodged Rich's main point, it has to be an attack that can't just be exploited using the same vector you used to get the cookie, right? Subdomain takeover is the first example I've heard that works, but that's pretty niche, you have to admit?
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didn't mean to dodge so much as try to diplomatically say that I agree that there some limitations to the value prop around the browser/cookie protections but that there are other use cases, like SSO and native OAuth/API, that can benefit
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