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one of my obsessions i keep periodically returning to is something like how much covert violence it’s possible to do with words and how difficult it can be to describe. “frame control” is the closest concept we have but i actually don’t like “frames” as a name for the thing

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QC (in Berlin 7/29-???)

@QiaochuYuan

· May 13

the most dangerous word in the phrase "believe the science" is "the"

QC (in Berlin 7/29-???)

@QiaochuYuan

i think the physical metaphor that “frame” suggests is much too mild. changing the literal frame on a literal picture is pretty weaksauce compared to what actual frame control can do. actual frame control can completely invert your sense of good and evil

7:03 PM · May 15, 2022Twitter for iPhone

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QC (in Berlin 7/29-???)

@QiaochuYuan

May 15

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@QiaochuYuan

“lens control” would be more accurate as a physical metaphor. a distorted lens can distort size, shape, color. it can make ugly things look beautiful and beautiful things look ugly. that’s much closer to what actual “frame control” can do

QC (in Berlin 7/29-???)

@QiaochuYuan

May 15

cycling through a bunch of other options in my head but they’re all terrible. concept control? ontology control? worldview control? ideology control? something about reality tunnels? en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality_t

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I like “frame control” because it feels related to “the frame problem”. When trying to reason explicitly (design AI), it’s difficult to exhaustively identify all the necessary assumptions. When humans are reasoning, we don’t notice the influence of background assumptions.

pavedwalden

@pavedwalden

May 15

plato.stanford.edu/entries/frame-

The Frame Problem
First published Mon Feb 23, 2004; substantive revision Mon Feb 8, 2016
To most AI researchers, the frame problem is the challenge of representing the effects of action in logic without having to represent explicitly a large number of intuitively obvious non-effects. But to many philosophers, the AI researchers' frame problem is suggestive of wider epistemological issues. Is it possible, in principle, to limit the scope of the reasoning required to derive the consequences of an action? And, more generally, how do we account for our apparent ability to make decisions on the basis only of what is relevant to an ongoing situation without having explicitly to consider all that is not relevant?

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