Karen Young

@ProfessorKaren

Resident Scholar , political economy of Gulf/MENA; …; …

Washington, DC
aei.org/scholar/karen-…
Dołączył luty 2011
271 zdjęć lub filmów Zdjęcia i filmy

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  1. 10 gru

    Great entry-level think tank job opportunity👇

    Come work with the awesome Middle East Program in DC! We are hiring a Program Coordinator:
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  2. 10 gru

    Please join me and this fantastic group of analysts/policymakers ( , Tatiana Gfoeller, ) for the E-Policy Circle, Wed, Dec 16 @ 10am EST/3pm GMT/6pm Abu Dhabi. Register:

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  3. podał/a dalej
    10 gru

    We are very excited to have , resident scholar contribute to 10.4. Her article 'Twin crises deepen Gulf states’ policy competition and independence' examines the impact 2020's & collapse of prices has had on the

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  4. 7 gru

    There are strategic actors across the global South that offer new sources of finance, models of authoritarian capitalism that complements China's approach, and China benefits from access to those locales, as my work on the role of Gulf states demonstrates:

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  5. 7 gru

    W/ respect to my colleague , this framing misses how China works in coordination with rising sources of financial intervention (e.g. Gulf states) and models of state-led development that should concern the US. Not a dated bipolar model.

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  6. 7 gru

    Good read by ; I would add Chinese interest in the "Middle East" is not region-wide, but rather in discrete locations. China is not always most important source of FDI and is often rivaled by the Gulf states (as our Gulf FADI tracker shows).

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  7. 5 gru

    Oman to begin reissuing tourist visas for the first time since March 2020; Saudi PIF plans to raise as much as $7 billion in loans as it seeks cash for new investments; UAE to allow full foreign ownership of firms. Check our tracker for more.

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  8. 4 gru

    Hello weekend.

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  9. 4 gru

    Not the same as being there in person, but glad to be part of again this year. The Gulf will continue to be central to US foreign policy goals.

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  10. 4 gru

    What do post-pandemic politics in the Gulf look like? A more competitive landscape, and that is a good thing.

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    3 gru

    . took to to discuss ways in which Iran can gain basic access to finance, early in 2021 that might facilitate an economic lifeline to Tehran in hopes of shoring up conditions for negotiations and a reformist agenda. Read here:

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  12. podał/a dalej
    3 gru

    Post-Pandemic Politics in the Oil-Addicted Gulf by

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  13. 2 gru

    💯. Good thread

    Given all this, why should the UAE’s oil market strategy remain the same? They’re tired of production restraint. OPEC may well pull off its customary feat and keep the group together this time around, but the UAE is moving in a different direction. The tensions are growing.
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  14. 2 gru

    (4/4)Yet, Iran's debt to GDP ratio is relatively low compared to neighbors in the Gulf, but steadily rising as the economy contracts. It has not had access to debt capital inflows, which has exacerbated its inflation problem and made its stock market ripe for speculation.

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  15. 2 gru

    (3/4) Looking at government revenue projections (data from central bank/Haver up to 2018; CEIC projection from 2018-2020) there is a drop-off, a fiscal cliff now without access to external finance.

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  16. 2 gru

    (2/4) Second, govt revenue generation and cash flow is very weak b/c Covid impact, sanctions, lack of payment for exports in 2019.

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  17. 2 gru

    (Thread 1/4) Some context re Iran's macro situation not in article. Oil revenue no rebound in 2021, because sanctions not easing quickly (and they shouldn't), market surplus, and Iran's rebound in exports is unwelcome in OPEC+. Also, early for FDI.

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  18. podał/a dalej
    2 gru

    There's a way for Biden to help Iran's economy without empowering the IRGC, says (via )

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  19. podał/a dalej
    1 gru

    . joins on this week's episode of "On the Middle East" to discuss US policy towards Saudi Arabia under Biden

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  20. 2 gru

    My latest for Bloomberg on some basic access to finance, early in 2021 that might facilitate an economic lifeline to Iran, in hopes of shoring up conditions for negotiations and a reformist agenda. It's a long shot, but window may be closing.

    There's a way for Biden to help Iran's economy without empowering the IRGC, says (via )
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