Weak computationalism: all models must be computational Strong c.: things are computational Cognitive c.: the mind is computational Universal c.: everything is computational Digital computation: mappings between [finite] ints Quantum c.: between complex Hyper c.: more than int
-
-
That tweet reads as a transgression of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.
-
Gödel discovered a property of specification languages, not of computable implementations. A computational system is always just in a state and goes to another one, according to its transition function. It is never paradoxical or undecided what the state should be.
- 30 more replies
New conversation -
-
-
We could still make partial theories about such an operator if it was *partially* constructive. E.g. some part of the output of the operator is observable but (in our current biological state) other parts are beyond our comprehension and we do not have concepts for them.
-
How would you test that the operator is doing more than computation? You obviously cannot deconstruct the operator's mechanism, so you would have to check its performance on an uncomputable task. How could you know that it yields the correct result?
- 2 more replies
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.