Absolutely. I just don't think that mathematical objects exist in an ontological sense. Mathematics is the domain of specifications. Uncomputable physics describes mathematical objects, not ontological ones, but these can be emergent patterns over existing structure.
Yes, Rovelli's perspective on LQG is close. But I think that the loonies: Zuse, Fredkin, Wolfram, t'Hooft are more likely correct, and the Church Turing Thesis is going to turn out to be a physical law. :)
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That does not really matter, because we are not discussing whether the Great Stephen is properly anointed to the cult. Take t'Hooft or Bolognesi. I guess that digital physics may be acceptable to about 5% of the foundational physicists already :)
End of conversation
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