In my usual view, all of mathematics is a priori and does not evolve, so the number 2 cannot be caused. But if you treat Peano's axioms as a computational generator operating on a Platonic substrate, then 2 is caused by a metamathematical machine executing Peano's axioms.
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The question of the cause of 2 is the same as the question of the cause of the shape of the Mandelbrot fractal. The natural numbers are literally a fractal, with Peano's axioms being one possible rule set, and we discover (not create) them and their properties by computation.
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If a universe presents itself via discernible differences (information) and is regular enough for computation, then its substrate (if it has one) must necessarily and sufficiently be a computer, i.e. a system capable of regular state change with Turing universality.
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To me this assertion appears to ignore the fact that even the computability of maths is conjecture not a fact ; so I would say that where you use 'must' in this and the following tweet, that 'I conjecture' would be more accurate?
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Mathematics is mostly uncomputable. The existence of turing universal computers that can do constructive math is an empirical fact.
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So why think anything else is computable if even maths isn't? Unrelatedly I confess I was riled by “computationalism the only working philosophical edifice” in a way I wouldn't be by “computationalism is an interesting idea worth exploring.”
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If you have any other philosophical system that can explain mind and universe from first principles, I’d love to hear about it!
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Solipsism and “it's all an illusion” can both explain all available data completely. But most of us reject them. Empiricism is very fashionable since C18, with naturalism/physicalism just now being challenged by a resurgent panpsychism but likely to stay ahead for a while. …
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @Plinz and
…Cartesian dualism meanwhile is completely out of fashion. But they all have difficulties. My particular hobbyhorses is to point out that all these philosophies—and hence all knowledge acquired with them—are _choices to believe_, not statements of fact.
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @Plinz and
I would argue for a form of theism as doing better than any others. The main objection is usually the problem of evil, which although a serious point, is not, I aver, a rational objection but an emotional one.
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Good and evil are defined normatively (via is-ought differences), and cannot be derived from pure reason or empirical observation. However, we can implement proclivity for moral preferences via intrinsic reward functions in nervous systems, and evolutionary reasons are plausible.
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