The only working philosophical edifice left?
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Replying to @Evollaqi
Even dualism and the different versions of idealism seem to require a computational foundation. Every supernatural entity must ultimately have natural causes (even if those are in a parent universe).
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Replying to @Plinz
Could you elaborate? What is your account of causation here? Why would a non-contingent entity (say, the number 2) require a cause? Why does your account of causation entail that dualism and idealism require a computational foundation? Thank you for letting me pick your brain!
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Replying to @Evollaqi
Causality is a feature of a model that separates a domain into independent, interfacing systems, whereby the evolution of one system is conditional of interfaced states of the other. If you treat the universe as a single, evolving state, then there is no causation within it.
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In my usual view, all of mathematics is a priori and does not evolve, so the number 2 cannot be caused. But if you treat Peano's axioms as a computational generator operating on a Platonic substrate, then 2 is caused by a metamathematical machine executing Peano's axioms.
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The question of the cause of 2 is the same as the question of the cause of the shape of the Mandelbrot fractal. The natural numbers are literally a fractal, with Peano's axioms being one possible rule set, and we discover (not create) them and their properties by computation.
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If a universe presents itself via discernible differences (information) and is regular enough for computation, then its substrate (if it has one) must necessarily and sufficiently be a computer, i.e. a system capable of regular state change with Turing universality.
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To me this assertion appears to ignore the fact that even the computability of maths is conjecture not a fact ; so I would say that where you use 'must' in this and the following tweet, that 'I conjecture' would be more accurate?
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Mathematics is mostly uncomputable. The existence of turing universal computers that can do constructive math is an empirical fact.
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So why think anything else is computable if even maths isn't? Unrelatedly I confess I was riled by “computationalism the only working philosophical edifice” in a way I wouldn't be by “computationalism is an interesting idea worth exploring.”
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If you have any other philosophical system that can explain mind and universe from first principles, I’d love to hear about it!
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Solipsism and “it's all an illusion” can both explain all available data completely. But most of us reject them. Empiricism is very fashionable since C18, with naturalism/physicalism just now being challenged by a resurgent panpsychism but likely to stay ahead for a while. …
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The nature of discernible truth is the set of theories that can explain the observations. The theory that there are others with minds similar to mine has more explanatory and predictive power than its negation, no?
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