The only working philosophical edifice left?
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Replying to @Evollaqi
Even dualism and the different versions of idealism seem to require a computational foundation. Every supernatural entity must ultimately have natural causes (even if those are in a parent universe).
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Replying to @Plinz
Could you elaborate? What is your account of causation here? Why would a non-contingent entity (say, the number 2) require a cause? Why does your account of causation entail that dualism and idealism require a computational foundation? Thank you for letting me pick your brain!
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Replying to @Evollaqi
Causality is a feature of a model that separates a domain into independent, interfacing systems, whereby the evolution of one system is conditional of interfaced states of the other. If you treat the universe as a single, evolving state, then there is no causation within it.
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In my usual view, all of mathematics is a priori and does not evolve, so the number 2 cannot be caused. But if you treat Peano's axioms as a computational generator operating on a Platonic substrate, then 2 is caused by a metamathematical machine executing Peano's axioms.
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The question of the cause of 2 is the same as the question of the cause of the shape of the Mandelbrot fractal. The natural numbers are literally a fractal, with Peano's axioms being one possible rule set, and we discover (not create) them and their properties by computation.
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If a universe presents itself via discernible differences (information) and is regular enough for computation, then its substrate (if it has one) must necessarily and sufficiently be a computer, i.e. a system capable of regular state change with Turing universality.
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To me this assertion appears to ignore the fact that even the computability of maths is conjecture not a fact ; so I would say that where you use 'must' in this and the following tweet, that 'I conjecture' would be more accurate?
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Mathematics is mostly uncomputable. The existence of turing universal computers that can do constructive math is an empirical fact.
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So why think anything else is computable if even maths isn't? Unrelatedly I confess I was riled by “computationalism the only working philosophical edifice” in a way I wouldn't be by “computationalism is an interesting idea worth exploring.”
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Mathematics is the domain of all formal languages, i.e. all possible specifications. Computation is the domain of all possible implementations. To exist is to be implemented.
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So, if I may try to explore a bit? have I understood right so far: (1) You're asserting that anything that exists must be computational (2) You reckon that this idea can be (or has been? If so, have you a ref?) built out into a philosophical edifice?
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Computationalism is simply the contemporary terminology of philosophical mechanism. A machine is a thing that can change state, i.e. somehow implement both a state and a transition function. Naturalism now means that everything has ultimately machine underpinnings.
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End of conversation
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