In my usual view, all of mathematics is a priori and does not evolve, so the number 2 cannot be caused. But if you treat Peano's axioms as a computational generator operating on a Platonic substrate, then 2 is caused by a metamathematical machine executing Peano's axioms.
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The question of the cause of 2 is the same as the question of the cause of the shape of the Mandelbrot fractal. The natural numbers are literally a fractal, with Peano's axioms being one possible rule set, and we discover (not create) them and their properties by computation.
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If a universe presents itself via discernible differences (information) and is regular enough for computation, then its substrate (if it has one) must necessarily and sufficiently be a computer, i.e. a system capable of regular state change with Turing universality.
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If we are dreams in God's mind, something must allow God's mind to progress in a non-random fashion and store its state. In other words, there must be some computer that runs the dreamer.
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Dualism entails two computational domains. For instance, dualism might allow you to act on this immediate moment in time by intermittently stopping the physical universe, letting the universe that computes your mind process your decision making, then update and commence physics.
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There is no way out of computationalism for a dualist, because computation is an a priori concept, i.e. it does not require physics but covers all possible systems with discernible differences that are capable of deterministic, probabilistic or random change.
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Replying to @Plinz
Why must the dualist accept computationalism is an a priori precondition on the possibility of everything else? Why not just on the possibility of the physical substrate?
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Perhaps minds operate radically differently from the sorts of change we're used to conceiving of?
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Is your argument the following?: 1. Computationalism is a necessary precondition for all change. 2. Minds are systems (or are part of systems) which involve change. 3. Therefore, minds are computational.
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The nature of consciousness or subjective experience is fundamentally different from computation. So even if the universe (being computational) produced something like consciousness it doesn't have to mean consciousness is also computational.
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Yes, that is a powerful intuition. It does not seem that the metacomputational operator you are looking for can be constructed. I think you are just a p-zombie, but the good news is that we can recover the subjective phenomenology of consciousness just fine.
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Replying to @Plinz @ali_talib
How do we recover the subjective phenomenology of consciousness if we're philosophical zombies?
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Replying to @Evollaqi @ali_talib
By reconstructing the machinery of our mind, and checking whether that mind might come up with a fictional narrative of a person that experiences qualia and real-time decision making, and gets access to the language center to tell itself and others about that.
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