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Replying to @usedtobethere
Gödel is a statement about formal languages, not about the mind. People or universe cannot solve decidability either.
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Replying to @Plinz
1/ now if I think of computational models as based on formal languages, i.e. languages for which Gödel's theorem applies, where ...
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Replying to @usedtobethere @Plinz
/2 am I going wrong in inquiring into reconciliation when computational metapsychology wants to find a way to model reality mind?
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Replying to @usedtobethere
we only need a subset of the formal languages: only computable models ("the stuff that works") are adequate.
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Replying to @Plinz
/1 that's the intriguing part for me. - Gödel: formal lang. := undecidability - "stuff that works" := decidability
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Replying to @usedtobethere @Plinz
/2 => "stuff that works" actually based on formal lang. for which undecidability is shown = contradiction where is my flaw?
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Replying to @usedtobethere
use a notion of computation that only transitions from state to state. you don't talk about reachability, but reached state
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yep, program states cannot be paradoxical, only certain types of descriptions can be
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Replying to @Plinz
so in the end incompleteness won't be a "threat" for your approach to work...
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