Radical skepticism eats itself: if part of a world-model predicts we cannot trust world-models, then we cannot trust that prediction either
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Replying to @The_Lagrangian
@The_Lagrangian I am totally skeptical of this. :) Partial world models are not world models, and invalidation is possible.1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @The_Lagrangian
@The_Lagrangian Once we buy that our brains seem to be able to do a bit of logic consistently at all, we can build Solomonoff epistemology1 reply 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @Plinz
@Plinz@The_Lagrangian Solomonoff epistemology is useful in that it is purely action-oriented. Beliefs are epiphenomena to it.1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @othercriteria
@othercriteria My belief in Solomonoff induction is pragmatically an epibelief; I do not change my actions because of it@The_Lagrangian1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @Plinz
@Plinz@The_Lagrangian Oh, I meant the epistemology of a SI user (inside view) rather than the epistemology of SI users (outside view).1 reply 0 retweets 1 like -
Replying to @othercriteria
@othercriteria@Plinz I am confused by this: what is the distinction b/w having a prob distribution over hypotheses and having beliefs?2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes
@The_Lagrangian One is a probability distribution and the other is something that looks true to you. @othercriteria
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