What work do you suppose it is that quaila do? Why do representations have to feel like anything? Don’t the mechanisms do all the work? That is the hard problem.
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How will one determine if the simulation (artificial mind) being implemented on non-biological hardware has instantiated phenomenal qualities? Even for humans we must rely on self reports. How will we ever know for machines?
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If you understand the precise referent of phenomenal experience, you can create an experiencing observer: a mind that hears its own voice and recognizes it as its own. Until then you can only recognize sentient behavior, like you do in cats.
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In your terminology, do you discriminate between “self” as the “stream of phenomology” and the model of “self” accessible in memory, appearing and disappearing in this phenomenology?
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Yes, you can have phenomenal experience without a self.
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Can we say that in the physical frame phenomenal consciousness is information, but within the simulation information is phenomenal consciousness?
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There is no consciousness in the physical frame. Most information in the mental frame is not phenomenal.
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I thinks it’s wonderful that someone in your position is interested in the nature of consciousness. One can see how there is much honest confusion in phil of mind. I think approaching the HP using comp sci theory and terminology with an awareness of philosophy will be fruitful!
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