3rd person frame (matter/mechanism) is contained in 1st person POV simulation. Matter/mechanism = simulation of a more fundamental substrate. The nature of this more fundamental substrate is not captured in the simulation (matter) but grounds it (phenomenality).
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Replying to @Hutcheson @Plinz and
If I understood you right, you're suggesting a form of idealism – we may not be able to explain mind in terms of matter but we can explain matter in terms of mind? Or have I misunderstood?
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @Plinz and
I’m suggesting that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (the medium of our simulation) is a property of the reality which is being simulated, and not a property of the simulation. I doubt all properties of the simulation (matter) can be explained in terms of p consciousness.
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Replying to @Hutcheson @chrisfcarroll and
For instance, the “fundamental” forces may be, in some form, properties of base reality and not properties of our subjective simulation(s). That is, the property of change/interaction/differentiation.
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Replying to @Hutcheson @Plinz and
I'm struggling with "simulation"! You mean matter&forces on the one hand, and p-consciousness on the other, are both 'expressions' of some underlying unified reality & you're using the word simulation where I've just used the word 'expression' ?
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @Plinz and
The human mind can be conceived of as a model/simulation of what-is. A property of the simulation might be “chair” “fun” or “self” etc. i.e. content. However, some aspects of this simulation, such as p-consciousness, are properties not of the simulation but rather what-is.
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Replying to @Hutcheson @Plinz and
I believe that part of my mind's working includes using models of the world but to say my mind /is/ a model/simulation is a whole different thing. Why would I believe that?
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @Hutcheson and
Well, there’s the premise that IF we will someday be capable of seamless reality simulation, then the statistical probability that we are already living in a simulation is very high. If you accept that initial premise, then the Simulation Hypothesis has a high degree of validity
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Replying to @SimsYStuart @Hutcheson and
I'm not sure if that is what
@Hutcheson means by 'simulation', I think he's suggesting something else?2 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
Replying to @chrisfcarroll @SimsYStuart and
But the Simulation Hypothesis 1st assumes that 'I am a Turing Machine' is viable. If we locate consciousness in the Turing Machine per se, then we must say that a stack of printouts on a very long shelf is conscious, if it contains the full description of a TM and its history
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No, we don't have to say that a stack of printouts is conscious. It is going to say that by itself, if you understand its language.
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Replying to @Plinz @SimsYStuart and
let me prod this line a little further: “Machine” in the name TM distracts us with subliminal memories of phenomenologically! exciting! things! that move & whiz Also “Simulation” : it excites memory of dazzling! VR! or Hollywood Movies /full/ of colour! sound! bangs! flashes! …
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @Plinz and
We experience the evocation of really! really! exciting! phenomological experience simultaneous with the denotation of TM, Simulation, Story as Abstract Mathematical Structure. Subliminally we associate the Pure Abstract Structure & the evoked! exciting! & lively! phenomenology!
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