A mind function is a computer function. A computer function is the same function with the same results in any kind of computing system. So the kind of computer and the kind of system drop away at the level of the function. All are in *that* kind of system.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @davidarredondo and
So what we think of as experientially model-free or concept-free still have their own structure at a higher level. What really drops away is the subjective talking-mind; the inner voice; the subjective conceptual framework.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @Plinz and
Yeah. Assuming our best computat models apply everywhere is just that - an assumption. Why should it apply to the unknown or unknowable? This is NOT to detract from the dazzlingly elegant models composed recently. The models are just incomplete & the best out there dont deny it.
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Replying to @davidarredondo @Plinz and
Yeah this is kinda my intuition. But I think that if the Deutsch CU hypothesis doesn’t apply to mental states in the way I’m imagining, then it implies something like panpsychism and distinct experiences for most objects.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @davidarredondo and
I should prob just go learn to code.
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Replying to @RealtimeAI @Plinz and
Mental states ( thoughts, sensations, feelings, experiences) are limited and limiting. Our brains are crude instruments. Language falls apart in describing what's beyond mental function but it is there nonetheless. Some refer to it as *the substrate* but its alive & aware.
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Replying to @davidarredondo @RealtimeAI and
Of course you will discover that your substrate is alive and aware, because you will per default perceive that you are your self, not your mind, i.e. the mental architecture that produces the computational simulation that your self inhabits.
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Replying to @Plinz @davidarredondo and
The act of observation is not directed on the coarse and unreliable structure of the mental representation itself, but on the optimum of the description function that projects from the representation to the mathematical archetype of the perceived object. /1
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I think that is why we strongly experience the perception of a perfectly structured reality behind a sufficiently stable perceptual representation. /2
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Replying to @Plinz @davidarredondo and
I think it’s a bit similar to how we can’t imagine new colours. The perceived colours we map diff. wavelenghts to are arbitrary, but since our perception doesn’t include colours other than that, our colour-perception feels complete and smooth.
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Replying to @raumgreifend @Plinz and
I think with our perception of reality in general it is similar. It’s not that we have a perfectly smooth, mathematical archetype-like representation generated, it’s just our brain not allowing us to see the seams by variably adjusting the expectation of what is perfectly smooth.
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