Now mapping the precise causal mechanisms (neurochemical and neuroarchitectural) which elaborate brainstem affect into cortical subjective experience is certainly a very, very hard problem. But that problem is not a conceptual problem. It’s just a problem of system complexity.
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I don't think that the mainstream of contemporary philosophy of mind is keeping abreast of Kant, Wittgenstein and Turing and the implications of mathematical constructivism. Enactivism is a metaphysical abomination, despite its pragmatic potential.
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Ah. Interesting. I confess I had taken you to share much of Dennett's view. I thought your presentation 2 (3?) years ago wasn't far from a view Dennett would endorse enthusiastically? I haven't yet watched your 1e9 talk.
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I am not aware of arguments of Dennett that I object to, but I don't think that he ever addressed the phenomenological gap between perceptual experience and conceptual thought. It reads as if Dennett had no experiential access to his perceptual mind.
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