The “hard problem” is only a problem for those who fail to place organismic affect (homeostatic, emotional affect) at the foundation of their model. Once you conceptualize subjective experiences as an emergent characteristic of affect, the hard problem vanishes completely.
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To be replaced by the problem of claiming that a "conceptualisation of subjective experiences as an emergent characteristic of affect" bears any connection to what our actual subjective experiences actually are.
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @SimsYStuart and
more generally, having a Hard Problem is rather better than not noticing that you have a Problem.
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Now mapping the precise causal mechanisms (neurochemical and neuroarchitectural) which elaborate brainstem affect into cortical subjective experience is certainly a very, very hard problem. But that problem is not a conceptual problem. It’s just a problem of system complexity.
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The conceptual problem that I see, is mapping a '3rd person' description of a brain to 1st person subjective experience. There is no such mapping?
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Why would it be necessary (initially) to map onto the minutia of 1st person subjexp(SE) in order to correctly model how affect is elaborated into SE? The goal should be to create a basic conceptual model which offers testable hypothesis. Right? One step at a time.
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Sorry I should have avoided the word mapping and said, The conceptual problem that I see, is translating a '3rd person' description of a brain to 1st person subjective experience. There is no such translation?
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Replying to @chrisfcarroll @SimsYStuart and
I think the Hard Problem grows out of the thought that, if we ever have a 100% accurate map of mechanisms in the brainstem and cortex, that would be a description of mechanisms, not a description of subjective experience.
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Yes, a description of brain functionality will only be the description of the mechanisms that produce mental content, including the content that there is a self that experiences mental content.
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Replying to @Plinz @chrisfcarroll and
Is the idea of reality as a construct a way to overcome the problem of mechanisms and what is behind them?
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The construct nature of the experienced reality is not an idea, but an inevitable conceptual clarification.
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You believe the simulation hypothesis is a valid model?
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