No, this is like saying "if your theory of QM has a measurement problem, it means you recognize that your theory doesn't work." No one's theory works, that's why it's a problem!
Yes, a description of brain functionality will only be the description of the mechanisms that produce mental content, including the content that there is a self that experiences mental content.
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I would sooner say just “a description of brain functionality will only be the description of the mechanisms. stop.“ The joining phrase, “that produce mental content…” presupposes that the mechanisms produce mental content.
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Oh. What else produces mental content?
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Is the idea of reality as a construct a way to overcome the problem of mechanisms and what is behind them?
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The construct nature of the experienced reality is not an idea, but an inevitable conceptual clarification.
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