I would put it like this: because it is impossible to understand how consciousness could arise from the activity of material things, it must be a property of material things itself, is always present in them, yet gets specific structure from the organization of matter into brains
-
This Tweet is unavailable.
-
-
Replying to @Plinz @elizpingree
I think that panpsychism may be a linguistic defect (when properly specified its meaning becomes self contradictory or vacuous), but the intuition is supported by the phenomenological experience of consciousness underlying all things (because things are created in the mind).
1 reply 0 retweets 5 likes -
Replying to @Plinz @elizpingree
Another (but probably unusual) way to frame the argument is that consciousness must be extra-computational, and because physics is computational, it must be realized outside of physics, and thus appear to us computational observers as an inseparable property of the substrate.
1 reply 1 retweet 6 likes -
Replying to @Plinz @elizpingree
Do you believe something can be realized outside of physics?
1 reply 0 retweets 1 like
In the sense that we could be in a simulation, yes.
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.