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Replying to @S33light
From my perspective, it seems that you never fully deconstructed your foundations. Instead, you take a certain level of phenomenology as given and at best confabulate below it.
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Replying to @Plinz
Whatever is given, is undeniably given by phenomenology. In my view, it is the assumption of non-phenomenal givens that needs to be deconstructed.
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Replying to @S33light
No, something needs to give the phenomenology. Not many things have the necessary and sufficient conditions to do that. Once you study the possibilities for languages that can convey phenomenological content, you discover the projects of mathematics and its constructivist update.
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Replying to @Plinz
Why would something generate qualia, and how? Language is a part of phenomenology, it just rides on the back end of lower level phenomenology.
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Replying to @S33light
There is a sense in which language has no phenomenological aspect, but is below that. This is the sense in which we study it in math and computation.
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Replying to @Plinz
If something had no phenomenological aspect we would not be able to detect it or conceive of it. (Back to the Cartesian interaction problem). There are two explanatory gaps to get to qualia - 1 rational & 1 empirical.
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Replying to @S33light
There is no explanatory gap. You perceive gaps because your explanation bottoms out in phenomenology, and then you try to build everything on top of that.
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Replying to @Plinz
In order for there not to be an explanatory gap there would have to be an arithmetic function that renders 'blue' without a video screen. There would need to be a reason it turns blue rather than points to a number.
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Structurally, blue is a polar coordinate representation of a surface feature shared by lighted objects. Experientially, blue is what that feature looks like in a relational context presented to the simulacrum of a person in the mind's narration.
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Replying to @Plinz
The structural coordinate isn't blue. Experientially, there is no plausible theory for why such a coordinate would 'look like' anything at all. I don't think that anything can be *only* a representation or simulacrum. If we didn't see sights then they couldn't simulate anything.
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