Then brains can't either.
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Replying to @Plinz
I agree. I think brains cache (tangible, local, sub-personal) pointers for our (personal, trans-tangible, trans-local) experiences. Matter is an impersonal sense organ, biology uses it sub-personally, and we use biology personally.
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Replying to @S33light
I have no idea what you are trying to say and if your words even mean anything.
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Replying to @Plinz
Are pictures any better?https://multisenserealism.com/art-charts-and-diagrams/current/ …
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Replying to @S33light
From my perspective, it seems that you never fully deconstructed your foundations. Instead, you take a certain level of phenomenology as given and at best confabulate below it.
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Replying to @Plinz
Whatever is given, is undeniably given by phenomenology. In my view, it is the assumption of non-phenomenal givens that needs to be deconstructed.
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No, something needs to give the phenomenology. Not many things have the necessary and sufficient conditions to do that. Once you study the possibilities for languages that can convey phenomenological content, you discover the projects of mathematics and its constructivist update.
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Replying to @Plinz
Why would something generate qualia, and how? Language is a part of phenomenology, it just rides on the back end of lower level phenomenology.
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Replying to @S33light
There is a sense in which language has no phenomenological aspect, but is below that. This is the sense in which we study it in math and computation.
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