It think that both self and mind are perceptual-participatory models of a nested sensory-motive phenomenon, which is sensation. Decisions are collaborative experiences that don't always seem collaborative.
You start from a phenomenological dualism, go to a representational monism, and try to somehow jump to an ontological dualism (for which you don't have evidence after explaining phen.) that is then merged again in a substrate monism, where "aesthetic" is defined in vaguest terms?
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I think that I'm starting from a meta-ontological meta-monism, and seeing dualism as just one (important) aesthetic configuration. I think any absolute primitive is necessarily vague but I can show it to be more defensible than 'being', 'information', 'energy', etc
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What exactly do you mean by "show"? You can make a proof? That means that you are using a computational language? But you will be more defensible than the idea of information?
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